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Abrazando Mexicanos:' The United States Should
Recognize Mexican Workers' Contributions to its
Economy by Allowing Them to Work Legally
The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is
the originalfoundation of all other property, so it is the most
sacred and invoidable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in
the strength and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder
him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of
those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the
one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders others
2
from employing whom they think proper.

The United States and.Mexico have become more than neighbors and free trade partners: they have evolved into a common labor market.3 In many parts of the U.S., employers are unable to
find sufficient workers for the most physically demanding and arduous jobs. 4 Meanwhile, Mexican workers are driven away from their
own country by low wages: forty percent of workers in Mexico earn
less than two dollars a day.5 These factors have pulled and pushed
I In English, the title means "Embracing Mexicans." The title of a past
program establishing temporary work authorization for Mexicans in the United
States, the Bracero program, meant "arms" in English, discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes.
2

ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS

1776 b. 1 Ch. 10 part 2.

See Dianne Solis, Filling a Need: U.S. Employer's Growing Reliance on
Mexican Workers Forges Opportunities for Labor Contractors, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 22,1999, (stating that the labor market in the two nations is
a "de facto, binational labor market."); Ginger Thompson, Chasing Mexico's
Dreams into Squalor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001 at Al, A6; Sam Dillon, Profits
Raise Pressures on U.S.-Owned Factories in Mexican Border Zone, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2001 at A16 (The binationalism of the U.S./ Mexican labor market extends
into Mexico, where U.S. owned factories called maquiladorasemploy Mexicans to
manufacture goods.).
3

4 See Anthony de Palma, A Tyrannical Situation: Farmers Caught in Conflict

Over Illegal Migrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000 at C1.
5 See Jeff Faux, Time for a New Deal With Mexico, 11
PROSPECT 22 (Oct. 23, 2000), at http://www.prospect.org.
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a large and growing population of Mexican immigrants to work in
the U.S., both legally and without authorization. 6 Unlike the past,
when Mexican immigrants worked primarily in Southwestern agriculture, today's immigrants live throughout the United States, and
work in a wide variety of economic sectors, including hospitality,
7
construction, manufacturing, meat processing, and clothing.
The laws and strategies the United States has developed over
the last 16 years to deter undocumented immigration are not effec6 See Trabajadorestemporales en Estados Unidos: cuantia, tiempo de estancia, ocupaci6n y salarios, BOLETfN EDITADO POR EL CONSEJo NACIONAL DE
POBLACi6N, Aflo 2, nums. 5-6/ enero-abril, 1998/ ISSN 1405-5589, available at
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/publicacioneslinea/boletines.boletines.html (stating
that "the migration of Mexican workers to the United States has, among other
determinants, the difference in salaries between the two countries, the dynamism
of the demand for employment of Mexican nationals in the neighboring country,
independently of its modality or migratory category- as well as the power of attraction exercised by the social networks constructed by immigrants over time. The
intensification of the migratory labor flow has resulted in consolidating strong ties
in the labor markets of Mexico and the United States, which have increasing importance in the economies of both nations, particularly in the sending and receiving areas, as well as a decisive impact on the incomes of families of Mexican
immigrants.") (Translated by the author).
7 Many newspaper articles from throughout the United States document the
increasing importance of Mexican immigrant laborers to many industries. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Big Apple Takes On A Flavor of Mexico: As California
Was Repelling its Border Neighbors, More Hospitable New York Saw Population
Multiply, Despite Rough Going, Community Seems to be Taking Hold, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1999, (New York City); see also Raju Chebium, Baltimore INS Stepping
Up Enforcement, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 1998, (Maryland); see also Pat Butler, HispanicsAdd Another Thread to South Carolina'sCultural Fabric:Immigrant
Population Outpaces State's General Growth, THE STATE, April 18, 1998 available
at Http://www.thestate.com/mex/ (South Carolina); see also Bill Hord, Vanguard is
Slowing Slaughter OMAHA WORLD-HERALD May 11, 1999 (Nebraska) (For a comprehensive look at how Mexican migration is reshaping the United States, see
http://www.dallasnews.com/specials/reshaping/, a six-part series of the DALLAS
MORNING NEWS. For a description of the national meatpacking industry's dependence on Latino immigrant workers, see David Barboza, Meatpackers' Profits
Hinge on Pool of Immigrant Labor N.Y. TIMES December 21, 2001. In particular,
recent events have demonstrated the poultry industry's reliance on undocumented
laborers. On December 19, 2001, a federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee indicted Tyson Foods, Inc. and six of its current and former managers on 36 counts, including smuggling workers from Mexico
and providing fraudulent documents to employees. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Town
Not SurprisedBy Tyson Smuggling Charges:In Alabama, the Recruitment of Illegal
Immigrants Was An Open Secret, One Official Says L.A. TIMES, December 21,
2001.).
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tive and produce a wide variety of problems.8 These laws are not
deterring undocumented immigrants, evidenced by the growth of
their population.9 Because some sectors of the economy are virtually dependent on Mexican undocumented workers, they continue
to move to and find work in the United States in large and growing
numbers.'0 However, due to increasing enforcement along the
U.S. Mexico border, a priority of the United States since 1994,11
deaths of would-be migrants are increasing as they seek more iso12
lated and dangerous, and therefore less patrolled, areas to cross.
Once here, immigrants toil in poor and often illegal working conditions to which they refuse to draw the authorities' attention for fear
of deportation. 13 Recently enacted laws obstruct even those undocumented immigrants who would otherwise qualify for legal immigrant status- those with U.S. citizen and permanent resident
immediate family or employer sponsors- from being able to become
legal permanent residents. 14 There is tremendous need to order
the flow of labor into this country so as to prevent unnecessary
deaths and promote participation in U.S. communities, and the
need to eliminate workers' fears of deportation so that they can
advocate for appropriate working conditions and wages. 15 The current system of implicitly recognizing that employers have undocumented workers while placing insurmountable obstacles against the
16
workers' ever becoming legal must end.
This note discusses why the United States should allow Mexican undocumented workers to adjust their status to legal permanent residents and to work legally. Part I reviews past policies
restraining the immigration of foreign laborers; and current policies designed to prevent undocumented low-skilled immigrants
from working in the United States. 1 7 Part II describes the problems
8
See discussed infra text accompanying notes 20-183. This note defines "undocumented immigrant" as foreign nationals residing in the U.S. without express
permission from the U.S. government to do so, including those who entered the
country without the proper documents as well as those who remained after their
authorizing documents expired.
9 See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
10 Id.
11 See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 158-174 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 112-124 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 124-183 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 204-212 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 20-124 and accompanying text.
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created by these policies and discusses why it is not in the interest of
the United States to continue to ignore the large and growing undocumented immigrant population.1 8 Part III reviews proposals to
allow Mexican immigrants to work legally in the United States, and

analyzes how such a program should be structured. 19
I.

RESTRAINTS AGAINST LOW-SKILLED WORKERS IMMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES

A.

Roots of Immigration Restraintsfor Low-Skilled Workers
The U.S. has historically exerted both tremendous demand for
immigrant laborers to work the most physically demanding and
lowest-paying jobs and ambivalence towards inviting poor newcomers. 20 Although the wide-scale practice of indentured servitude was
largely abandoned by 1820, it remained a. concern of the U.S. Congress. 21 The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 made voluntary or involuntary servitude illegal throughout the U.S.22 The Alien Contract
Labor Law of 1885,23 later incorporated into Sections 3 and 5 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917,24 prohibited employers
from contracting aliens and prepaying their transportation to the
U.S., or in any other way encouraging them to migrate to fulfill
previously made contracts; voided any such existing contracts; made
employers who violated the law punishable by a fine of $1000 per
alien involved; and made ship captains who knowingly brought con5
tracted laborers into the U.S. punishable by imprisonment.2
In 1943, Congress waived the bar on contracted laborers of the
1917 Immigration and Nationality Act for native-born residents of
North, South, and Central America who wanted to work in U.S.
agriculture during the War. Section 3 Proviso 9 of the Immigration
See infra notes 125-183 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
18

20 See generally, SELECT COMM'N ON
(SCIRP), U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
PORT (1981).

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

THE NATIONAL INTEREST STAFF RE-

21

ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR 11 (1991).

22

Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 (repealed) (current provisions at 18 U.S.C.

§ 1581).
23

Alien Contract Labor Laws Act of February 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332

(1885), 8 U.S.C. § 1552.

24
Immigration and Nationality Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29 § 3, H.R.
10384,Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874, 8 U.S.C. § 173 (repealed), now covered by 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), (10), (38), (b)(3), (d)(7).
25

Id.
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and Nationality Law of 1917 allowed the Immigration Commissioner, with the Secretary of Labor's approval, to control and regulate the admission and return of contracted workers, or any other
26
inadmissible immigrant, applying for temporary admission.
B.

20th Century Immigration Policy Toward Low-Skilled
Laborers: The Bracero Program:1942-1960

During World War II, agricultural employers in the southwestern U.S., short of workers due to the war, asked U.S. administrative
agencies to help them find sufficient labor.27 The administrative
agencies responded with the Bracero program, invoking the authority of Section 3 Proviso 9, by admitting Mexican laborers on shortterm contracts timed to coincide with harvesting seasons. Under
thd Bracero program, between 1942 and 1964, federal administrative agencies assisted U.S. agricultural employers to hire 5 million
Mexican workers. 2 8 While over time, the Bracero program underwent many manifestations, overall its outcome was very consistent.
The U.S. and Mexican governments provided U.S. agricultural employers with Mexican laborers who had very little recourse to en29
force the protections the law afforded them.
Consequently, employers did not provide adequate working
conditions or wage and hour protections. U.S. administrative agencies, including the INS, the U.S. Employment Service, and the Farm
Security Administration, were delegated (and, initially without
Congressional delegation, allocated to themselves) broad discretion
to administer the program.30 These agencies were beholden to employers' interests, and chose to look the other way when employers
31
violated the terms of the workers contracts.
Thus, while on paper, the Bracero program offered workers
some protections, those protections were rarely enforced. Bracero
workers who participated in the program were from rural undevel26
27

Id.
KiTrTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMI-

INS 19 (1992)
Id. at 218.
See generally, id.
30 See id. at 20 (For example, Public Law 45, enacted in 1943, granted the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with approval of the
Attorney General, free rein to determine how, when and where Bracero workers
were to enter, work in, and leave the U.S. by the Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, H.J.
Res. 96 Pub. L. No. 45 § 5(g).).
GRATION, AND THE

28
29

31 Id.
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oped areas of Mexico and had little education, making them
scarcely able to enforce the terms of their contracts. 32 Bracero
workers were contractually bound to their employers. If they encountered other employment opportunities or better working conditions, they were not allowed to pursue them. If they failed to
maintain the condition of their admission by, for example, going to
work for another employer, they were subject to apprehension and
deportation. 33 At the end of their contract, they were also subject
34
to deportation.
C. H-2A Visas for Temporary Agricultural Workers
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act allowed temporary
foreign workers to enter the U.S. on H-2A visas if there was a certified labor shortage, a provision that was updated by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 35 Many agricultural laborers
from the Caribbean have entered the U.S. on H-2A visas to work in
Florida or the Northeastern U.S.36 However, due to the bureaucratic hurdles involved for both employees and employers, relatively few choose to participate in the H-2A program. 37 Although
the General Accounting Office estimates there are 600,000 undocumented farm workers in the U.S., during FY 1996, employers applied for only 15,000 H-2A visas for foreign agricultural workers,
accounting for less than 1% of the of the U.S. farm workers. 3 8 In
FY 1997, employers asked for 21,000 employees through the program, and H-2A workers made up slightly more than 1% of the
39
agricultural workforce.
The bureaucratic hurdles imposed by the H-2A program are
viewed as a major deterrent to participation for both employers and
employees. 40 First, employers must try recruiting domestic workers
Id.
Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, H.J. Res. 96 Pub. L. No. 45 § 5 (g).
34 See CALAVITA, supra note 27 at 22.
35 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (15) (H) (ii)(a).
36 See ALEC WILKINSON, BIG SUGAR: SEASONS IN THE CANE FIELDS OF
FLORIDA (1989).
37 See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
38 See H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. GAO/HEHS-98-20 (1998) (Testimony of the United States General Accounting Office).
39 Id.
40 Id.
32
33
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by placing newspaper advertisements. 41 If the employer is unable
to find workers through recruitment, they ask their state employment service to certify that there is a shortage of agricultural laborers in their area. 42 Then the employer must apply to the
Department of Labor for a certification that a labor shortage exists
and that bringing in the foreign workers will not adversely affect
the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. 43 Although
given the vagaries of farm work, such as weather, it is difficult to
predict exactly when farm workers will be needed, employers requesting visas are required to apply 60 days before they are
needed. 44 The Department of Labor has twenty days to make a
decision. 45 The G.A.O. determined that in fiscal year 1996, the Department of Labor did not meet the twenty-day deadline in one
third of the cases. 46 Employers also must demonstrate to the Department of Labor that the housing they will provide to the temporary workers meets health and safety requirements. 4 7 If the Labor
Department grants certification, which, during a twenty-one month
period from 1996 to 1997, they did in 99% of the cases, the employer then asks the INS for authorization to bring in the workers. 4 8
Only after the INS grants authorization will the State Department
issue non-immigrant visas to the workers, which usually take three
49
weeks to process.
Some employers participating in the H-2A program use it to
exert tremendous pressure on their workers. For example, corporations owning sugar cane plantations in South Florida have relied on
H-2A workers from Caribbean islands to harvest cane since 1943.50
A 1989 book described a system whereby plantation-owning corporations and Caribbean politicians who hand out H-2A visas as patronage agree that sixty percent of H-2A visas will go to
experienced laborers and forty percent to novices. 51 Once in FlorImmigration and Nationality Act § 218(a)(1).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 218(b)(4), 20 C.F.R. § § 655.102(d),
655.103(d),(f), 655.105.
41

42

43

Id.

Id.
45 Id.
46 See
44

H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, supra note 38.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.

See
51 See
50

WILKINSON,
WILKINSON,

supra note 36 at 6.
supra note 36 at 50-51.

244

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.

[Vol. XVIII

ida, workers have eight days to demonstrate their cane-cutting ability at the start of the harvest. The plantation supervisors monitor
the workers carefully during the trial period. If the supervisor finds
the worker inefficient or sloppy during the trial period or the first
half of the harvest season, the worker's contract is revoked, and he
is fired and deported. He must pay his own fare to return to his
island and reimburse the corporation for the expense of bringing
him to Florida.5 2 A 1983 report of the Congressional Subcommittee on Labor Standards, "Job Rights of Domestic Workers: The
Florida Sugar Cane Industry" found that the Department of Labor
district office in Atlanta whose district encompassed the Florida
sugarcane plantations demonstrated "indifference, disdain, and apathy" toward investigating or challenging the labor practices of the
53
industry.
D. Workplace Enforcement

Recent efforts to prevent immigrants from working without authorization focus on making employers check workers' documents
and preventing border crossing with military equipment. 54 The
workplace enforcement strategy was developed in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 55 Later, it was reinforced by the 1994 Attorney General's Strategy to Strengthen Enforcement of the Nation's Immigration Laws 56 and by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and' Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).57
In 1986 Congress passed IRCA to achieve the goal of ending
undocumented immigration to the U.S. through two means: first, by
allowing undocumented immigrants to become legal permanent reSee WILKINSON, supra note 36 at 51.
See WILKINSON, supra note 36 at 243.
54 The deportation of immigrants with criminal convictions is the highest enforcement priority but will not be discussed in this note as it does not pertain to
immigrants in the workforce.
55
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. §1324 (1986)
amending § 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
56 See Illegal Immigration Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive;
More Evaluation Needed General Accounting Office Report to the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, and the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., December
11, 1997, (GAO/GGD-98-21).
57 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 309 (enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996).
52

53
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sidents of the U.S.,58 and, second, by thereafter sanctioning employers for hiring undocumented workers.5 9 IRCA allowed immigrants
who had resided continuously in the U.S. since January 1, 1982, met
educational and good moral character requirements, and registered
by a certain deadline to become legal temporary and subsequently,
permanent residents of the U.S.6o Undocumented immigrants who
worked in agriculture for at least ninety days in each year between
1983 and 1986 were also allowed to become legal permanent residents. 61 Lastly, those who could document continuous residency
in the U.S. since prior to January 1, 1972 were allowed to register
themselves as legal permanent residents, without facing a time limit
62
in which to do so nor English proficiency requirements.
IRCA's legalizing provisions were popularly known as "amnesty" for undocumented workers. Through the 1986 amnesty, 1.7
million people, including 1.1 million Mexican nationals, became legal immigrants. 63 After amnesty recipients became legal permanent residents and citizens, they applied for visas for their family
members, thereby increasing the number of legal immigrants seeking admission to the U.S. from Mexico. For example, in 1995, 12.5%
of immigrants legally admitted to the United States were from Mexico; in 1996, the figure rose to 17.9%, and in 1997, it rose to
18.4% .64

IRCA's other means for ending undocumented immigration
focuses on employers. Because Congress was convinced that employment draws undocumented immigrants to the U.S., they sought
to "de-magnetize the magnet" by moving enforcement to the workplace. 65 The authors of the law, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY)
and Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-KY), believed that "legislation containing employer sanctions is the most humane, credible,
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1986).
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. §1324a (1986).
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1986).
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1986).
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 203a, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1986).
Immigration Reform and ControlAct Report on the Legalized Alien Population U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service (1992)
at 8.
64 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997, U.S. Government Printing Office:
Washington, D.C., 1999 at 21.
58
59
60
61
62
63

65

NANCY HUMEL MONTWEILER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF

ANALYSIS, TEXT, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

31 (1987).
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and effective way to respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens."' 66 However, because they did not want to place onerous burdens 67 on employers, legislators allowed employers
exemption from sanctions if they could show a "good faith effort"
to comply with the law. This good faith exemption was an implicit
recognition that despite the law, many employers would continue to
hire undocumented laborers, and that they should not face stiff
penalties for doing so, unless they are pattern and practice
68
violators.
IRCA established an employment authorization verification
procedure that all employers must follow when hiring new employees. 69 After hiring, employees must fill out an employment authorization verification form, known as an "1-9," attesting under penalty
of perjury to their authorization to work legally in the U.S.7° The
employee then chooses documents from a government-issued list to
provide their employer to demonstrate their legal work authorization. 71 Some documents, including alien registration cards and U.S.
Passports, are sufficient to establish work authorization without
supplements because they provide both a photo of their bearer and
information about their bearer's employment authorization. 72
Other documents, such as Social Security Card and U.S. Birth Certificates, must be backed up with another document to establish
identity. 73 The number of documents qualified to prove work authorization was reduced slightly by the Illegal Immigration Reform
74
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt.1 at 46 (1986).
See MONTWEILER, supra note 65. Senator Simpson was particularly concerned that verification requirements not impinge too much on employers.
66
67
68

Id.

Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101-103, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1986).
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101, 274a (a)(1)(B)-(D), 8 U.S.C.
1324a (1986).
69
70

71

Id.

Id.
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101, 274a (a)(1)(B)-(D), 8 U.S.C.
1324a (1986).
74 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, (enacted as Division C of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996) removed U.S. naturalization
and citizenship certificates from the list. However, as of this writing, the INS has
not changed the 1-9 form to reflect the change in the law.
72

73
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The employer then must make a good faith effort to verify that
the documents are valid. 75 The good faith effort serves as an affirmative defense against sanctions. 76 According to the law, "a person or entity has complied with the requirement of this paragraph
with respect to examination of a document if the document reasonably appears on its face to be genuine... nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed as requiring the person or entity to solicit the
production of any other document or as requiring the individual to
produce such a document. '77 Furthermore, although all employers
are required to verify the work eligibility of all employees, the Congressional Conference Committee that drafted the final law asked
the INS to consider the size of the employing entity when enforcing
the law and to direct enforcement of the criminal provisions to repeat offenders. 78 The Committee did not want small-scale enterprises to be targeted for enforcement, another implicit recognition
79
that employers would continue to hire undocumented employees.
The House Judiciary Committee directed INS officials to respond in
a timely manner to requests from individuals to verify the authen80
ticity of documents provided by their employees.
Employees must make an attestation that they are authorized
to work on the 1-9 Form. 81 Employers must retain this form with a
photocopy of the employees' work authorizing documents in the
employee's file for three years after the employee is recruited, referred, or hired or one year after the employee's employment is
terminated, whichever is later.82 INS or Department of Labor in-

75 Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101 § 274 A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a (1986) and see infra text accompanying notes 91-94 describing the weakening of employer sanctions under IIRIRA, supra note 57.
76 Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101 § 274 A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(6) (1986).
77 Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101 §274a(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(C)(A) (1986).
78 See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, CONFERENCE REPORT No. 99-1000 at 86 (1986).
79 Id.
80 See IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND LEGALIZATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, HousE JUD. COMM. REr. 99-682 at 61 (1986).
81 Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101 §274a(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(2)
(1986).
82 Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101 §274a (b) 2-3, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(3) (1986).

248

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVIII

vestigators may inspect employers' 1-9 files to see if they comply
83
with the law.

Under IRCA, employers receive sanctions for employing undocumented workers. Fines range from $250 per immigrant for a
84
first offender to $10,000 per immigrant for third time offenders.
Pattern and practice violations are criminal offenses which can result in six month's imprisonment or up to a $3,000 fine. 85 Employers are subject to civil fines of $100-$1,000 for not complying with
86
the record-keeping provisions of the law.

Not surprisingly, after IRCA was enacted, the market for
fraudulent employment-authorizing documents flourished. Legislators responded to the widespread use of fraudulent documents subsequent to IRCA by enacting the Immigration Act of i990, adding
§ 274C to the Immigration and Nationality Act.87 Section 274C in-

creased the penalties for the "use, production, or receipt of fraudulent immigration documents." 'Receipt of" means using another's
document to establish work eligibility, not the employer's "receipt
of" the employee's documents to demonstrate work authorization.
The penalties for immigrants caught using fraudulent documents
are tough. They are subject to civil penalties and are also excludable 88 and deportable, 89 meaning that otherwise qualified immi-

grants caught using fraudulent documents cannot become legal
permanent residents and all immigrants caught using fraudulent
documents are deportable. However, while §274C focused penalties on employees for using fraudulent documents, it did not alter
Id.
Immigration Reform and Control Act §101a §274(e)(4)(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (3)(A)(4)) (1986).
85
Immigration Reform and Control Act §101al §274 (e)(4)(a) I-iji, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a (3)(f)(1) (1986).
86
Immigration Reform and Control Act §101al §274 (e)(5), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a (3)(A)(5) (1986).
87
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 274C, Stat. 104, 4978-3087
(1990).
88
Later, the IIRIRA, supra note 57 changed the concept of "excludable" to
"inadmissible." See Enid Trucio-Haynes and Lois Gimpel Saukat, Grounds of Inadmissibility Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996: Part One 98-01 Immigr. Briefings (January 1998) and Part Two 98-02
Immigr. Briefings (February 1998).
89 Immigration and Nationality Act § § 212(A)(6)(F), 241 (A)(3) (C), 8
U.S.C. § 1324c (1990).
83
84
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employers' exemption from sanctions as long as they make good
faith efforts to verify their employees' documents are valid. 90
Continuing the trend of punishing undocumented immigrants
harshly but not their employers, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act strengthened the "good
faith" exemption to employer sanctions while creating virtually insurmountable obstacles for undocumented immigrants seeking to
become legal. 91 IIRIRA considers employers to have complied
with their duty to verify their employee's work authorizing documents if they make a good faith attempt, notwithstanding a "technical or procedural failure" to actually verify the documents. 92 Under
IIRIRA, INS investigators who encounter violations are to explain
them to employers and allow the employers ten days to remedy the
situation before sanctioning them. Employers who have a "pattern
and practice" of employing undocumented immigrants do not qual93
ify for the good faith exemption.
A memorandum interpreting IIRIRA issued by then INS Acting Associate Commissioner Paul Virtue in 1997, told INS investigators to presume that an employer has in good faith complied with
the law unless: 1) the totality of the circumstances shows an intent
to avoid a requirement; 2) the employer failed to comply in know90 Immigration Act § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (1990). INS application of
§ 274C without adequate due process protections was the basis for class action
litigation against the INS, Walters v. Reno, No. 94-1204C (D. Wash. filed Aug. 17,
1994). Plaintiffs were immigrants who waived or failed to request hearings to .contest the INS charges that they had used fraudulent immigration documents in violation of §274C. Plaintiffs alleged that the INS failed to provide adequate notice of
the charges against them and of their right to challenge the INS' charges. The
Federal District Court for the District of Washington granted a permanent injunction against this INS practice, which was upheld on appeal. A settlement agreement has been reached between the counsel for the plaintiffs, the National
Immigration Law Center and the American Civil Liberties Union Immigrants
Rights Project, and the Government, and provisionally approved by the Honorable John C. Coughenour of the United States District Court for the District of
Washington. Among other provisions, the INS has agreed to stop using the forms
they had previously used to advise 274C violators of their rights. They also agreed
to vacate all § 274C final orders issued against class members who received the
forms challenged in the lawsuit and who waived their right to contest the charges
against them. See Notice of Hearing Regarding a Proposed Settlement of Walters
v. Reno at http: www.ins.usdoj.gov.
91 IIRIRA, supra note 57.

92
Immigration and Nationality Act § 274A(b)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6), as
amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 411.

93

Id.
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ing reliance on the exculpation provision; 3) when the employer
corrected, or attempted to correct, the erroneously prepared 1-9, he
or she made misrepresentations for which he or she is responsible;
4) the 1-9 preparer knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that it
contained a false statement or had no basis in law; 5) INS or Department of Labor previously issued a warning about the employer's failure to comply. 94 The memorandum is yet another
example of the U.S. government's implicit recognition that the employment of undocumented immigrants is widespread.
E.

Border Enforcement

The harshness of these immigration laws did not deter undocu-

mented immigrants from moving to and working in the U.S. However, their presence was increasingly politicized. In 1994, after a
long campaign characterized by racial rhetoric, California voters

passed Proposition 187, 95 a referendum that made undocumented
immigrants ineligible for all public services offered by the State of
California, including schools and hospitals. Although parts of Proposition 187 have since been ruled unconstitutional, 96 the campaign
to pass the law garnered support for and made politicians aware of
94 See File No. HQIRT 50/5.12 (Mar. 4, 1997) reprinted in 2 Bender's Immigration Bulletin 430 (June 1, 1997).
95 Proposition 187 was a ballot initiative supported by 59% of the California
electorate.
96 Proposition 187's provisions requiring social workers and teachers to report undocumented public benefits applicants and schoolchildren to the INS were
held unconstitutional. Undocumented immigrant children have a Constitutional
right to a public education, as established by the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe.,
457 U.S. 202, (1982). See League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v.
Davis (and related cases) Nos. 98-55671, 98-55681, 98-55682, 98-687, 98-55692 (9th
Cir. July 29, 1999) (final settlement agreement). Then-Governor Pete Wilson appealed these decisions. Current California Governor Gray Davis, who campaigned against Proposition 187 when it was an initiative and was elected governor
in 1998 promising to end divisiveness in California politics, chose not to withdraw
Wilson's appeal, but to ask the appeals court to mediate a settlement between the
State of California and the anti-Proposition 187 groups that originally sued to
overturn it, including the League of United Latin American Citizens. See George
Skelton Missteps by Both Strain Ties Between Davis, Bustamante L.A. TIMES, April
29, 1999,; see California'sProposition187 Rears its Head: Governor, Supporters at
Odds, INTERPRETER RELEASES, 76 No. 31 1233,1234. For a discussion of Proposition 187's parallels to previous laws designed to deter immigration in California,
see Minty Siu Chung, Note, Proposition 187: A Beginner's Tour Through a Recurring Nightmare, 1 U.C. Davis Int'l L. & Pol'y 267.
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the popularity of scapegoating undocumented immigrants, setting
the stage for later enforcement legislation.
In February 1994, Janet Reno, then Attorney General, and Doris Meissner, then INS Commissioner, announced a new immigration enforcement strategic plan. The strategy identified five
objectives: fortifying the border, increasing deportation of immigrants with criminal convictions, reforming the political asylum application process, increasing enforcement of immigration laws in
the workplace, and encouraging legal immigrants to become naturalized citizens. 97 The strategy called for blocking undocumented
immigrants' preferred routes of entry through San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas by intensifying enforcement manpower and
technology in these areas. 98 The creators of the strategy believed
that undocumented immigrants crossing the border would be diverted to areas with more difficult terrain, where the Attorney
General thought INS had a tactical advantage. 99 The goal was to
deter immigrants by making the journey to the U.S. much more
difficult. Once El Paso and San Diego had been blocked off, the
plan called for employing the same strategy in Tucson and South
Texas, and finally, for all parts of the southwestern border. 100 After
the southwestern border was sealed off, Border Patrol resources
would be deployed to the northern border and the Pacific, Atlantic,
and Gulf coasts. 10 1
Congress, however, apparently did not think the Attorney
General's plan was comprehensive enough. In 1996, they enacted
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
which dramatically increased immigration enforcement.102 IIRIRA
tightened immigration enforcement activity on the borders, requiring the Border Patrol to hire and deploy 1,000 new agents and 300
new support personnel every fiscal year from 1997-2001.103 The in97
See Illegal Immigration Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive;
More Evaluation Needed, supra note 56, app. I at 64.
98 See id. Historically, 65% of immigrants seized at the southwestern border
were apprehended in these two areas. However, it is unclear whether that was a
function of greater illegal crossing activity in these areas or of greater Border Patrol deployment.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102
103

IIRIRA, supra note 57.
IIRIRA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1365a.
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crease doubled the number of agents patrolling the borders.10 4
New agents were to be deployed "along the border in proportion to
the level of illegal crossing of the borders of the United States measured in each sector during the proceeding fiscal year and reasonably anticipated during the next fiscal year. ' 10 5 IIRIRA required
existing agents be deployed in "areas of high illegal entry to the
U.S. in order to provide a uniform and visible deterrent to illegal
entry on a continuing basis."'1 6 IIRIRA mandates and provides
funding for fences along the border, and waives provisions of the
Endangered Species Act that would affect their construction.' 0 7
IIRIRA authorized the Attorney General to request other Federal
agencies to transfer military equipment to the INS for the Border
Patrol to use, including aircraft, helicopters, vehicles, night vision
10 8
goggles and scopes, and motion sensor units by the INS.
IIRIRA expanded the enforcement of immigration law beyond
the borders and increased controls on the people allowed to temporarily cross the borders. It authorized the Attorney General to
enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies she deems qualified to investigate, apprehend, or detain immigrants under her supervision and direction. 109 Although Congress
ultimately rejected this idea, Section 110 of IIRIRA would have
required that INS register all non-U.S. citizens crossing the border
to keep track of how many legal immigrants of which nationalities
depart the U.S. each year and who stays past the time they are allowed by their visa. 110 IIRIRA increased civil penalties for crossing
the border illegally.11
104 See Juan P. Osuna, 1999 Update on Selected Enforcement Provisionsof the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 99-01 IMMIGRBRIEF 1 (1999).
105 IIRIRA, supra note 103.
106 IIRIRA, supra note 103.
107 IIRIRA §102, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1996).
108 IIRIRA §103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1996).
109 IIRIRA §133, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (1996).
110 IIRIRA §110, 8 U.S.C. §1365a (1996) (In October 1999, Congress passed a
law to delay implementation of this section. However, after the September 11,
2001 attack, INS is under intense pressure to develop Congressionally-mandated
entry and exit data collection. This was evident in an October 12, 2001 hearing of
the House Immigration Subcommittee. See Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Technology and Border Security, AILA IMM. LAW TODAY, December 2001 at 590.).
111 IIRIRA §105, 8 U.S.C. §1325(a)(b) (1996).
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Legal Obstacles Preventing Undocumented Immigrants from
Becoming Legal Permanent Residents

In addition to lightening employers' burden and increasing enforcement along the borders, IIRIRA rewrote immigration law,
making it much more difficult for low-income undocumented immigrants to legally immigrate to the U.S. and very arduous for undocumented immigrants to become Legal Permanent Residents
1 12
even with family member sponsorship.
Prior to IIRIRA, would-be immigrants likely to become "public charges"- dependent. on public benefits- were not allowed to become legal permanent residents. 1 13 IIRIRA made family sponsors
legally liable for any public benefits received by the immigrants
they sponsor. 114 This responsibility extends until the sponsored immigrant becomes a U.S. citizen through naturalization; works at
least 10 years (forty qualifying quarters) in the U.S.; leaves the U.S.
permanently; or dies. 115 In order for their family members to become legal permanent residents, sponsors must show that their income, including the family member sponsored and all other family
members, is over 125% of the poverty level. Sponsors who cannot
meet the income requirement can ask others to co-sponsor; however, cosponsors are also legally liable for the sponsored immigrants' use of public benefits. 116 Sponsored immigrants have legally
cognizable causes of action against sponsors who fail to maintain
them at 125% of the poverty level. 117 Becoming a public charge
8
within five years of arriving in the U.S. is a deportable offense."
112 See infra notes 113-124 and accompanying text for a description of the
obstacles to legal immigration for low income undocumented immigrants imposed
by IIRIRA.
113 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
114 IIRIRA § 551, 8 U.S.C. 1183A (1997) created a new, legally enforceable
affidavit of support. On May 25, 1999, then Vice President Albert Gore announced a clarification that only those immigrants who relied on public cash benefits for income maintenance or who are institutionalized for long-term care can be
considered public charges. INS officers should assess the "totality of the alien's
circumstances" when making the public charge determination.
115 Immigration and Nationality Act § 213 A(a)(2), (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)
(2), (3), 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2.(e).
116 Immigration and Nationality Act § 213 A, 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2c(2)(iv)(B).
117 Immigration and Nationality Act § 213A(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e), 8 C.F.R.
§ 213a.2(d).
118 Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(5). To deport an immigrant for
becoming a public charge, the INS must first determine whether the immigrant
became a public charge within the first five years after admission to the U.S. If so,
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Thus, many low income people are unable to meet these requirements, and therefore cannot sponsor their family members.
In addition to the income barriers to family sponsorship, Congress made it extremely difficult for undocumented immigrants living in the' U.S. to become legal permanent residents, even if they
have eligible family sponsors. In 1997, Congress allowed Section
245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to expire. 119 Under
this section, immigrants who entered the U.S. illegally were allowed
to become legal permanent residents within the U.S., subject to a
thousand dollar fine, if they had a U.S. citizen or legal permanent
resident family sponsor or employer sponsor. 120 Immigrants who
entered the U.S. illegally, for whom sponsors filed petitions after
January 15, 1998, are no longer allowed to finish processing their
paperwork within the U.S. 121 Because §245(i) was allowed to expire, the only option for immigrants who entered the U.S. illegally
but who have family or employer sponsors is to go to the U.S. Consulates in their countries of origin to process their paperwork. 1 22
However, IIRIRA contains a harsh punishment for immigrants who
the immigrant may try to prove that the circumstances which caused her or him to
become deportable arose after he or she was admitted to the U.S. Only those who
fail to prove to the INS' satisfaction that their dependence on public benefits is due
to circumstances that arose after they were admitted are deportable.
119 Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), added by,
Pub. L. No. 103-317 § 506(b), 108 Stat. 17824 (1994), and amended by, Pub. L. No.
105-19 § 111 (Nov. 26, 1997).
120 Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) added by
Pub. L. No. 103-317 § 506(b), 108 Stat. 1724 (1994), and amended by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208 § 376 (a), (b).
121 This deadline was later revived to April 30, 2001 by the Legal Immigrant
Family Equity (LIFE) Act, enacted December 21, 2000, codified at Title XI of H.R.
5548 enacted by reference in H.R. 4942 (Pub. L. No. 106-553; 114 Stat. 2762), H.
Rep. No. 106-1005. (The LIFE Act amendments are codified at Title XV, Division
B, of H.R. 5666, enacted by reference in H.R. 4577 (Pub. L. No. 106-554; 114 Stat.
2763), H. Rep. No. 106-1033. See President Signs Watered Down Immigration
Measure, Advocates Express Disappointment, 78 No. 1 INTERPRETER RELEASES.
Although both the House and Senate enacted separate measures to re-establish
Section 245(i) with some limitations in the spring and summer of 2001, as of this
writing, legislation reestablishing 245(i) has not been enacted. Some within the
immigrant advocacy community are hopeful that Congress will re-extend 245(i) in
early 2002. See Suzanne Gamboa, House Kills Chance for Immigrants THE AssoCIATED PRESS, December 20, 2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A8386-200lDec2O.html.).
122
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have been unlawfully present in the U.S. Upon leaving the U.S.,
they may not return for three years if they have been unlawfully

present in the U.S. for six months to a year, or for ten years if they
have been unlawfully present for one year or more. 123 Thus, undocumented immigrants who the United States previously allowed

to become legal permanent residents-those with U.S. citizen or permanent resident family members or employer sponsors- now face

government-enforced separation from their family or employment
if they try to become legal permanent residents, a strong deterrent. 124 These laws have created a virtually insurmountable obstacle to undocumented immigrants ever becoming legal.
II.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY THESE POLICIES AND WHY THEY
SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED

A.

The Undocumented Mexican Immigrant Population
is Growing

Despite lawmakers repeated attempts to repress them, undocumented Mexican immigrants are not deterred. In 1996, the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that there
were five million undocumented immigrants living in the U.S.125
The INS estimated that about 275,000 undocumented immigrants
moved to the U.S. each year between 1992 and 1996.126 Data derived from the 2000 Census reveal that the U.S. has a larger un-

documented immigrant population than analysts previously
thought-

possibly eight million or more. 127 Meanwhile, the Na-

123 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1996). See
State Department Cable (98-State-060539) for detailed information about how the
period of unlawful presence is calculated.
124 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1996).
125 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: WASHINGTON D.C., STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES, 1997 at 200
(1999).
126

Id.

See Aaron Zitner, Immigrant Tally Doubles in Census, L.A. TIMES, March
10, 2001 at Al. This estimate of the nation's undocumented immigrant population
was developed through different methodologies. Prior to conducting the Census,
the Census Bureau estimated there were 275 million people living in the U.S.,
utilizing birth, death, and official immigration records. The actual count was 281.4
million. When the Census Bureau applied sampling to adjust for people they may
have missed, they arrived at 285 million, a dramatic increase from their prior estimate. The Census Bureau believes that they previously underestimated the undocumented immigrant population, and that the real number is 5.5 million. Paul
127
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tional Population Council of Mexico (Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n) predicts that, based on current patterns, between 400,000 and
500,000 Mexicans will migrate to the United States each year for
the next 30 years. 128 The National Population Council of Mexico
estimates that of the eight million Mexicans who live in the United
129
States, three million are undocumented.
These estimates are borne out by local statistics. For example,
the New York City Planning Department has documented the tremendous growth in the population of Mexican undocumented immigrants living in NYC. 130 The Planning Department's most recent
analysis of immigration to New York City, based on INS, Census
Bureau, and City records, found that Mexican nationals constituted
a marginal amount of the legal immigrants settling in NYC between
1990 and 1996- less than 700 a year. Yet, Mexican mothers, from
whom no immigration status information was recorded, gave birth
to 29,000 babies during those years, more than 3% of all the babies
born in NYC between 1990 and 1996.'3' New York City does not
seem to be the only part of the nation impacted by growing Mexican undocumented population. Recent newspaper articles have
cited employers from South Carolina, Maryland, Nebraska, Texas,
Washington, Arizona and other regions stating that their current
labor force for arduous, physically demanding is largely composed
of undocumented Mexican immigrants. 132
Harrington and Andrew M. Sum, demographers at Northeastern University,
looked at data the Department of Labor collects monthly on the number of Americans who are working and the number of people employers report they employ.
The difference between the two numbers suggest an undocumented immigrant
population of 15 million. The Census Bureau's estimate of the undocumented immigrant population can be found in Appendix A of Report 1 at http://www.census.
gov/dmd/www/ReportRec2.htm.
128 See Mark Stevenson Report: Mexican Migration to U.S. Will Continue,
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS December 5, 2001.
129

Id.

130

DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING,

YORKERS 1995-6 (1999).
131 Id. at 25.
132 See Tim Steller,

CITY OF NEW YORK: THE NEWEST NEW

Immigration's Tough Riddle: With Pressure for Reform
Now Mounting, Ideas Range from More Enforcement to Throwing the Border
Open, but the Riddle Won't Be Solved Easily, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July 30, 2000, at
At. See also Ginger Thompson and Steven Greenhouse, Mexican "Guest Workers": A Project Worth a Try N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2001 at A4. See also Solis supra
note 3; de Palma supra note 4; Alonso-Zaldivar supra note 7; Chebium supra note
7; Butler supra note 7; Hord supra note 7; Barboza supra note 7.
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Ineffectiveness of Border Enforcement

The growth of the U.S. undocumented immigrant population is
testament to the inadequacy of its immigration enforcement strategy. 133 Despite clear indicators that their efforts are not working,
U.S. immigration policymakers have continued trying to deter the
flow of these workers by militarizing the U.S.-Mexico border and
sanctioning their employers. 134 The U.S. currently spends $1 billion
on border enforcement annually. 35 In the past five years, the
United States has vastly increased policing of its southern border,
without having a real impact in the number of people crossing it
surreptitiously. 36 Yet, as the Federal Government itself concedes,
neither strategy seems to have a measurable effect on deterring undocumented immigration. 137 Neither does the GAO find evidence
that the vastly increased resources the U.S. expends at the borders
are having a measurable impact. The GAO's third report on the
effectiveness of the Attorney General's 1994 strategic plan and the
increased enforcement called for by IIRIRA says that "available
information on the interim results of the strategy does not provide
answers to the most fundamental questions surrounding INS' enforcement strategy along the southwest border. That is, given the
billions of dollars that INS has invested in implementing the strategy, how effective has the strategy been in preventing and deterring
1 38
aliens from illegally crossing the border?"
The only clear impact augmented border enforcement appears
to have had is increased deaths among immigrants.1 39 As would-be
laborers are pushed to more difficult and dangerous places to cross,
reported deaths along the Arizona border have increased from
twelve in 1995 to fifty-nine in the first seven months of 2000.140
134

See infra notes 54-111 and accompanying textO.
See Steller, supra note 132.

135
136

See id.
See id.

133

137 See generally Illegal Aliens: Fraudulent Documents Undermining the Effectiveness of the Employment Verification System, Before the Subcomm. of Immigr. and Claims, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., GAO/T-GGD/
HEHS-99-175 (1999) (statement of Richard M. Stana, Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues General Government Division, General Accounting
Office).
138 Evaluation of Southwest Border Strategy General Accounting Office,
GAO-GGD-99-44 (1999) at 3.
139
See De Palma, supra note 4.
See Steller, supra note 134.
140
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More that 300 immigrants died crossing the U.S./Mexico border in
2000.141

C. Ineffectiveness of Workplace Enforcement
Neither are employer sanctions deterring undocumented immigrants. 142 Employers, who need these workers and want to employ
them, are faced with a quandary: 143 hire unauthorized workers pretending their work authorization documents are authentic, and
(maybe) face sanctions if caught; or have insufficient employees,
and reduce production. 144 Employers avoid the penalties the law
imposes by claiming that they did not know the documents were
fake, which is sufficient to establish a "good faith effort" they are
required to make to escape punishment. 145 Because many documents can prove employment authorization, some employers hon146
estly do not know that their workers' documents are fraudulent.
For example, between October 1996 and May 1998, INS exempted
2,100 employers from sanctions because they determined the em147
ployers unknowingly hired undocumented immigrants.
Enforcement of immigration law in the workplace is easily
thwarted by employers and immigrants alike, although immigrants
face much stricter penalties if caught. 148 Employees easily circumvent the requirements of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
149
of 1986 (IRCA) by providing false documents to their employers.
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), "Significant
See Thompson and Greenhouse, supra note 132.
See supra notes 65-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of employer
sanctions.
143 See De Palma, supra note 4.
Id.
144
145 See supra notes 75-80 and 91-94 and accompanying text (describing good
faith exemption to employer sanctions).
146 See supra notes 71-74 (describing documents that can be used to establish
employment authorization).
147 See Illegal Aliens: FraudulentDocuments Underminingthe Effectiveness of
the Employment Verification System, supra note 137 at 2.
148 See notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describing punishment of immigrants caught using fraudulent documents).
149 See A Giant Sucking Sound: Mexicans Working in the United States, THE
ECONOMIST, June 5, 1993 at 28 (explaining that employer sanctions do not effectively deter undocumented immigration due to the variety of documents that can
be used to establish employment authorization, coupled with employers' strong
disincentive to scrutinize their employees' documents thoroughly. By claiming that
they thought their employees' documents were valid, employers avoid sanctions.).
See also the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-603).
141
142
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numbers of unauthorized aliens can still obtain employment authorization because IRCA's employment verification process can easily
be thwarted by fraud." 150 Not surprisingly, after employer sanctions
were put into practice in 1986, the market for fraudulent immigration documents flourished. 15 1 In one month in 1998, INS investigators in Los Angeles seized almost 2 million fraudulent work
authorization documents. 152 INS detected around 50,000 undocumented immigrants who had produced 78,000 fraudulent documents to their employers between October 1996 and May 1998
153
nationwide.
D.

Current H-2A Program an Ineffective Alternative for Both
Undocumented Workers and Employers

Agricultural employers and immigrants who wish to comply
with the law are deterred from participating in the current H-2A
visa process because it is confusing, redundant, and slow. 154 The
relatively few farm workers who participate in the H-2A program
do not understand the protections it affords them or how to enforce
them.1 55 Despite all the hurdles employers must go through to receive workers, Department of Labor officials complain that the way
the program is structured makes it difficult for them to ensure abusive employers do not participate. 56 Little monitoring of the actual
labor conditions of H-2A workers occurs. 57 Thus, the current opportunity the United States offers to Mexican undocumented work150
See H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, supra note 38 (stating that "the
Immigration and Nationality Act allows employers to rely on documentation that
reasonably appears on its face to be genuine. Thus, 600,000 illegal aliens could be
working in agriculture without any agricultural employers' violating the law with
respect to their responsibilities under Federal law." ).
151
See Illegal Aliens: FraudulentDocuments Underminingthe Effectiveness of
the Employment Verification System, supra note 137.
152
See Illegal Aliens: FraudulentDocuments Underminingthe Effectiveness of
the Employment Verification System, supra note 137 at 2.
153
See Illegal Aliens: FraudulentDocuments Undermining the Effectiveness of
the Employment Verification System, supra note 137 at 2.
154
See H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, supra note 38.
155
See H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, supra note 38.
156
See H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, supra note 38.
157
See WILKINSON, supra note 36.
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ers to work legally is inadequate, and only covers the agricultural
sector, anyway.
E. Undocumented Immigrants' Impact on the Workplace
As the authors of IRCA recognized, work attracts undocumented immigrants to the U.S.158 Although statistically, INS workplace enforcement varies from year to year, the threat of workplace

enforcement remains consistently real in the minds of undocumented immigrants.

59

Knowing that their employers could report

them to INS deters undocumented immigrants from reporting
working conditions and wage and hours practices that violate the
law. 160 The system promotes the "worst scenario possible: laborers
risking their lives in cross-border journeys, then becoming
uninvolved residents and unprotected workers who drive down
''16 1
wages.
The construction industry in Houston, Texas offers one example of the demographic shift of the current labor force. During the
1970s construction boom in Houston, organized labor grew and
prospered. Seventy percent of construction workers in the 1970s
158 See MONTWEILER, supra note 65. This belief was borne out by the study
on immigrants who became legal, permanent residents under the amnesty. See Immigration Reform and ControlAct Report on the Legalized Alien Population,supra
note 63, at 14, 30. Economic reasons made 94% of the immigrants who became
legal permanent residents under the amnesty move to the U.S. A higher proportion of men who became legal permanent residents under the amnesty reported
participating in the labor force than of U.S. men generally: 94 versus 88 percent.
Id.
159 See Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
1997, supra note 64, at 165 ("Total worksite cases completed dropped annually
from 7,403 cases in FY 1991 to 5,283 in 1995, and 5,149 cases in 1996, then rose to a
high of 7,537 in 1997. The number of arrests rose significantly from 7,554 in FY
1994 to 17,553 in 1997, an increase of 132 percent.").
160 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Illegal Employers, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Vol. 11 No. 25, December 4, 2000, available at http://www.prospect.org.
161 See de Palma, supra note 4 (saying that current immigration law enforcement detrimentally focuses on border enforcement without acknowledging immigrants' contributions to the economy, creating the "worst scenario possible:
laborers risking their lives in cross-border journeys, then becoming uninvolved residents and unprotected workers who drive down wages."). Compare AFL-CIO
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON IMMIGRATION (2000) (stating that "current
enforcement efforts have failed to stop undocumented people from entering the
U.S.; encourage discrimination and the exploitation of undocumented workers;
and leave all workers' labor rights vulnerable.").
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were union members. 162 But when the oil boom ended in the early
1980s devastating the Texas real estate market, the few contractors
who could find work could no longer afford to hire union members,
and instead turned to immigrants. 163 Now, undocumented laborers
have become the backbone of the Houston construction industry. 164
Union leaders, who were once so incensed by the undocumented
laborers that they brought a video of them working on the George
R. Brown Convention Center to the Texas Congressional delegation, have realized that they must recruit immigrants if unions are
to survive.1 65 Richard Shaw, Secretary General of the AFL-CIO
says, "If you want to increase you numbers, you have to organize
the workers who are out there. I've got to ask myself, at the end of
my term, do we turn out the lights, or do we find a new way to
build?"

66

The impact of fearful undocumented workers on the workplace
extends to all workers. This has forced the U.S. labor unions, long
opposed to liberalizing immigration laws, to do an about face as
they confront the challenges of organizing largely immigrant workplaces. 167 They are pushing for the legalization of undocumented
workers present in the U.S. The AFL-CIO has recognized that undocumented immigrants have become such a critical part of the
U.S. labor force that they have reversed their previous support of
employer sanctions and are calling for workplace protections for
undocumented immigrants. 168 Kent Wong, director of the U.C.L.A.
162 See Edward Hegstrom, Once-Fearful Organized Labor Now Sees Immigrants as Future, HOUSTON CHRON. Aug. 22, 2000 at Al.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See id and see infra text accompanying notes 168-174. The ongoing support for legalization for undocumented laborers after the September 11, 2001 attack is demonstrated by the AFL-CIO's December 4, 2001 vote to support
amnesty for undocumented laborers. A large majority of almost one thousand
delegates from the 66 unions that compose the AFL-CIO voted in favor of the
proposal, which said in part "we remain committed to pursuing an agenda that
seeks legal status, opportunity for citizenship, protection of workplace rights, deterrence of employer abuse, and opportunities for full civic participation for hardworking immigrant workers and their families." See Tom Ramstack, AFL-CIO
Adopts Amnesty Proposal THE WASH. TIMES December 5, 2001 at C6.
168 See AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON IMMIGRATION supra
note 161, and see Ramstack, supra note 167 (describing the AFL-CIO's December
4, 2001 vote to support amnesty for undocumented workers).
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Center for Labor Research and Education says "there has been a
complete, 180 degree shift in the way the AFL-CIO and other unions treat immigrants."' 169 The AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement on Immigration calls for permanent legal status for
undocumented workers via a new amnesty program; preferring regulated legal immigration over unregulated illegal immigration; protecting immigrant workers' rights for both their own interest and to
ensure the labor rights of all American workers; working together
with business to satisfy their needs for more employees while safeguarding employees already present; cooperating with business to
increase professional development for all workers; and criminally
penalizing employers who exploit undocumented workers. 170 The
Statement calls for refocusing immigration enforcement on employers, ending temporary worker programs, replacing the 1-9 system
for enforcement of immigration laws with new enforcement strategies that render employers criminally liable for violating workers'
rights and recruiting undocumented workers, educating immigrant
and U.S. born workers about the role of immigrants in U.S. society
and workers rights, and restoring safety not benefits taken from immigrants by the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu7
nity Reconciliation Act.' '

The AFL-CIO was motivated to change its stance because the
current immigration enforcement system increasingly thwarts labor
organizers' efforts. 172 For example, after undocumented workers at
a Holiday Inn Express in Minneapolis, Minnesota voted to join Local 17 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union in 1999, their employer called in the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to review their work authorization docu173
ments, resulting in deportation proceedings for 8 of the workers.
While some of those workers have obtained temporary visas that
will allow them to testify in the subsequent lawsuit they filed alleging unfair tampering with their right to organize, once the lawsuit is
over, they will face deportation to Mexico. Union organizing ef169
170

notel6l.
171

notel6l.
172

notel6l.
173

See Hegstrom, supra note 162.

See AFL-CIO

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON IMMIGRATION,

supra

See AFL-CIO

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON IMMIGRATION,

supra

See AFL-CIO

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON IMMIGRATION,

supra

See Aleinikoff, supra note 160.
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forts are increasingly thwarted by the lack of protection afforded
17 4
undocumented workers.
Even employers are concerned. The national organizations of
the hospitality, construction, and meatpacking industries are also
pushing for laws that reflect the reality that their workforce in these
175
industries is largely composed of undocumented immigrants.
F.

Undocumented Immigrants' Contributions to the
U.S. Economy

While opponents of increasing immigration claim low-skilled
American workers' wages are reduced due to the presence of lowskilled foreign workers, other experts' views contradict those findings. 176 Harvard Professor of Public Policy George Borjas says that
"the economic impact of immigration is essentially a distributional
impact" that accelerates division between upper and lower classes. 177 On the other hand, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan testified before the House Banking Committee that the
unemployment rate for those with less than a high-school education
declined by four percent between 1994 and 1999, twice the rate of
decline in overall unemployment. 17 8 The decline in low-skilled
workers' unemployment concurrent with the influx of undocumented laborers shows that even if low-skilled workers compete
with immigrants, they are able to find jobs at wages for which they
are willing to work. 179 Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute contended in 2000 that "twenty years ago, (nativists) said that (increas174 See de Palma supra note 4 (citing the AFL-CIO's support for amnesty for
undocumented workers was founded in labor's difficulty organizing undocumented
workers).
175 See Aleinikoff, supra note 160.
176 See De Palma, supra note 4.
177

GEORGE J. BORJAS HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE

AMERICAN ECONOMY 103 (1999).
178 See The Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Report on Monetary Policy
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., July 22, 1999 (Testimony of
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan) (stating that the unemployment rate for those with less than a high-school education declined by 4% between
1994 and 1999, twice the rate of decline in overall unemployment); see John Mickelwaith "Who Gains? Not Only the Immigrants, but America, Too," THE ECONOMIST, March 11, 2000 (interviewing Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute "Twenty
years ago, (nativists) said that (increasing immigration) would cause unemployment. We have let in another 15 million people, and we have the lowest unemployment in history.").
179 See Mickelwaith, supra note 178.
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ing immigration) would cause unemployment. We have let in
another 15 million people, and we have the lowest unemployment
in history." 180
In sum, the United States' current strategy for deterring undocumented immigration is not working. 181 By enacting the laws
discussed in Part I, the United States has cut off every avenue for
the undocumented to become legal, even as the size of the undocumented population grows. 18 2 It is long overdue to recast the way
the United States approaches undocumented immigration. Instead
of viewing undocumented immigrants as a burden, it is time to recognize what Adam Smith called the most sacred and invoidable
property, each man's own labor, by allowing Mexican immigrants to
18 3
become legal permanent residents and to work legally.
III.

How

SHOULD SUCH A PROGRAM BE DESIGNED?

A.

PoliticalWill for Change

For the reasons discussed in Part II, leaders in both Mexico
City and Washington D.C. believe the time has come to rethink the
U.S. approach to immigration enforcement and consider new proposals. Mexican President Vicente Fox and U.S. President George
Bush have warmed relations between the two nations setting the

stage for meaningful policy changes that address the needs of the
economy and people of both countries.1 84 The leaders are moti180
181
182

See Mickelwaith, supra note 178.
See supra notes 125-180 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 112-124 and accompanying text (concerning the obstacles
to legal immigration for undocumented immigrants).
183 A successful program allowing Mexican immigrants to work legally and to
become legal permanent residents can serve as a model for extending similar benefits to nationals of other countries. Accepting that undocumented immigrants will
continue to find ways to immigrate to the United States no matter what barriers
are erected is the first step toward better managing their migration.
184 See William Safire, Fox, Bush, and Helms, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2001, at
A15 (describing the warming relations between Mexico and the U.S.). President
Bush's first foreign trip as President in February 2001 was to visit Mr. Fox on his
ranch. Mr. Fox visited California in March 2001 to draw support for his migration
proposals. Both Presidents have nominated top level officials, U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft, Mexican Foreign Secretary Jorge Castefieda, to a binational working group on immigration. Most interestingly, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
committee and a long time foe of previous Mexican administrations, decided that
the Committee should travel to Mexico to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee of Mexico. Id.
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vated by more than good will towards immigrants. Even after the
attack on America of September 11, 2001, the economic conditions
in both countries require focus on Mexican undocumented immigration. 185 And politicians, who in 1996 enacted draconian laws to
combat undocumented immigration, are now courting the growing
numbers of Latino and Asian American voters. 186 According to
Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), "the President's goal is to eliminate to a great extent the black market in labor that currently exists. That can save lives and improve the marketplace by providing
legal and orderly mechanisms for U.S. employers to hire available
workers. 1 87 Meanwhile, Vicente Fox, the first Mexican president
in seventy-one years who was not a member of the Partido
Revolucianario Institucional,made campaign pledges that he would
pressure the U.S. to recognize the rights of Mexican nationals work-

ing in the
B.

U.S.188

Legalization and Employment Authorization Proposals
Under Consideration

Mexican President Vicente Fox, elected in July 2000, has circulated his own proposal for employment authorization and legalization of Mexican workers in the U.S. As the former governor of
Guanajuato, one of Mexico's biggest immigrant-sending states, Fox
is well aware of and deeply committed to improving the situation of
Mexican workers in the U.S.189 While discussions continue between the United States and Mexico about legalizing the status of
Mexican workers, an early version of Fox' proposal asked the U.S.
to grant Mexicans 250,000 work visas a year. 190 In return, the Mexican government would create incentives for would be-immigrants
to stay home, including loans for micro-enterprises and scholarships
for children. 191 The Mexican government would also deter future
185
186
187

TIMES
188

See Aleinikoff, supra note 160.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 160.
Eric Schmitt, Bush Panel Backs Legalizing Status of Some Migrants, N.Y.

July 24, 2001 at A14.

See Jose de Cordoba and Joel Millman, Mexico Charts Shifts in Relations
with the U.S.: Big Increase in Visas is Sought in Return for Border Control, WALL
ST. J. July 7, 2000 at A8.
189 See Thomas B. Edsall and Cheryl W. Thompson, Alliance Forms on Immigrant Policies: Business, Church, Labor Groups Unite on Liberalization, WASH.
PosT Aug. 7, 2001 at Al.
190 See de Cordoba and Millman, supra note 188.
191 See de Cordoba and Millman, supra note 188.
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immigration by taking undocumented immigrants' communal land
rights away and making their family members ineligible for social
92
welfare programs.
On July 20, 2001, a cabinet-level working group appointed by
President George W. Bush and President Vicente Fox recommended that the United States allow undocumented Mexican immigrants who met certain qualifications to become legal permanent
residents of the United States. 193 Although they have not finalized
their plan, the working group is considering length of presence in
the United States and employment history as criteria for determin194
ing who will be allowed to become legal permanent residents.
The plan also includes allowing Mexican immigrants to work legally
in the United States on a temporary basis in a wide variety of industries, including health care and meat processing. 195 Although the
details have not been resolved, the working group is considering
196
labor and wage protections for the Mexican workers.
C.

Proposals to Reform Current H-2A Program

Legislators are also considering reforming the current system
for allowing temporary agricultural workers into the U.S. Senator
Gordon Smith (R-OR) has tried for several years to garner support
for changing the H-2A system. 197 S 2337 would establish a registry
of temporary agricultural workers to provide for a sufficient supply
of such workers and amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to
streamline procedures for the admission and extension of stay of
non-immigrant agricultural workers, and for other purposes. 9 8
These proposals have met with resounding criticism from farm
worker advocates and the Mexican government. For example, Raul
Yzaguirre, the President of the Latino civil rights organization National Council of La Raza, wrote a letter to Senator Bob Graham,
(R-FL) one of the sponsors of S 2337,199 laying out the objectives of
immigrant and farmworker advocates for pro-worker reforms of the
192
193
194

195
196

197
198

See de Cordoba and Millman, supra note 188.
See Schmitt, supra note 187.
See Schmitt, supra note 187.
See Schmitt, supra note 187.
See Schmitt, supra note 187, at A14.
S. 2337, 105th Cong. (1998).

Id.

199 Letter from Raul Yzaguirre, President, National Council of La Raza, to
Honorable Bob Graham, U.S. Senator, September 27, 1999.
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current farmworker system. Mr. Yzaguirre asked legislators to prioritize the following: extend existing labor law protections to
farmworkers, enforce protections effectively and improve access to
the justice system, allow farmworkers to work for the employer
they choose, increase wages and living conditions for farmworkers
to encourage productivity and reduce poverty.20 0 Mr. Yzaguirre
summed up with "Unfortunately, the current proposals, focussed
exclusively or primarily on expanded use of the H-2A program or
201
"legalization," do nothing to advance these priorities.
Heeding in part to Mr. Yzaguirre's suggestions, Senator Smith
and Representative Howard Berman (D-CA) proposed legislation
that would streamline the application process for U.S. agricultural
employers to demonstrate that they have a need for foreign workers, allow employers to provide housing vouchers to their employees instead of actual housing, and allow immigrant workers who
have been employed in U.S. agriculture for at least 360 days in the
past six years to apply for Legal Permanent Residence in the U.S.202
D.

Considerationsfor Future Programs

Any future temporary visa program for Mexican workers in
the U.S. must not repeat the mistakes of the Bracero program. The
U.S. government should guarantee Mexican workers the same minimum wage, working conditions, and collective bargaining rights as
U.S. workers. Mexican workers should be allowed to work for
whomever they choose and their legal presence in the U.S. should
not be revoked if they switch employers. The U.S. and Mexican
governments should agree to establish a bilateral agency similar to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission whose mission it
is to orient workers about how to exert their rights in the U.S.
workplace and to provide access to real enforcement in case their
rights are infringed. Most importantly, Mexican immigrants who so
desire should be given the option of becoming legal permanent re20 3
sidents of the United States.
Any future employment authorization for Mexican workers in
the U.S. must not repeat the mistakes of the current H-2A program.
200
201

202
203

Id.
Id.
See Thompson and Greenhouse, supra note 132, at A14.

The best way to ensure that immigrants can enforce their rights is to allow
them to enter the path toward U.S. citizenship.
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Instead of multiple agencies overseeing the program, one agency
should be given responsibility for administering the whole program,
including enforcement of workers rights. Instead of making the application process so burdensome, opaque, and confusing that few
participate, the application process should be easy, transparent and
well-explained. Emphasis should be placed on ensuring that all
participants, employers and employees, know what the law requires
of them and that it is enforced. Protections for workers on the
books have no impact unless they make it into the workplace.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many factors make the enactment of temporary work authorization and adjustment of status for Mexican workers desirable, in20 4
cluding the growth of the undocumented immigrant population,
the virtual dependence of some sectors of the economy on Mexican
undocumented workers, 20 5 the need to order the flow of labor into
this country so as to prevent unnecessary deaths and promote participation in U.S. communities, 20 6 and the need to eliminate workers' fears of deportation so that they can advocate for appropriate
working conditions and wages. 20 7 The time has come for the
United States to recognize what Smith called the "most sacred and
invoidable" property. 208 As the U.S. labor movement has recognized, allowing undocumented workers to become legal permanent
residents and to work legally in the United States is critical to improving working conditions and wages for all workers. 20 9 Continuing the current system of implicitly recognizing that employers have
undocumented workers while placing insurmountable obstacles
against the workers' ever becoming legal is not wise. 210 It promotes
lawlessness, including illegal working conditions and violence along
the border. 2 11 However, in changing its policy toward these workers, the United States must be careful to avoid problems of the past
by ensuring that the program enacted is not heavily biased in favor
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of employers.2 12 By ensuring that workers are fully aware of and
capable of exercising their rights, by abrazando Mexicanos instead
of treating them merely as braceros, the United States can address
the needs of its economy, promote prosperity and the formation of
stable and safe communities.
Karen Fleshman
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See supra notes 27-34 and 202-203 and accompanying text.

